Team Reasoning, Framing and Self-Control:An Aristotelian Account by Gold, Natalie
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Gold, N. (2013). Team Reasoning, Framing and Self-Control: An Aristotelian Account. In N. Levy (Ed.), Addiction
and Self-Control: Perspectives from Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience. (pp. 48-66). Oxford University
Press.
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 18. Feb. 2017
Team Reasoning, Framing, and Self-Control
Page 1 of 20
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2014.
All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the l icence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Kings
College London; date: 05 December 2014
University	Press	Scholarship	Online
Oxford	Scholarship	Online
Addiction	and	Self-Control:	Perspectives	from	Philosophy,
Psychology,	and	Neuroscience
Neil	Levy
Print	publication	date:	2013
Print	ISBN-13:	9780199862580
Published	to	Oxford	Scholarship	Online:	January	2014
DOI:	10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199862580.001.0001
Team	Reasoning,	Framing,	and	Self-Control
An	Aristotelian	Account
Natalie	Gold
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199862580.003.0004
Abstract	and	Keywords
Decision	theory	explains	weakness	of	will	as	the	result	of	a	conflict	of	incentives	between
different	transient	agents.	In	this	framework,	self-control	can	only	be	achieved	by	the	I-
now	altering	the	incentives	or	choice-sets	of	future	selves.	There	is	no	role	for	an
extended	agency	over	time.	However,	it	is	possible	to	extend	game	theory	to	allow
multiple	levels	of	agency.	At	the	inter-personal	level,	theories	of	team	reasoning	allow
teams	to	be	agents,	as	well	as	individuals.	I	apply	team	reasoning	at	the	intra-personal
level,	taking	the	self	as	a	team	of	transient	agents	over	time.	This	allows	agents	to	ask,	not
just	“what	should	I-now	do?’,	but	also	‘What	should	I,	the	person	over	time	do?’,	which
may	enable	agents	to	achieve	self-control.	The	resulting	account	is	Aristotelian	in	flavour,
as	it	involves	reasoning	schemata	and	perception,	and	it	is	compatible	with	some	of	the
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psychological	findings	about	self-control.
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In	the	Nicomachean	Ethics,	Aristotle	discusses	the	problem	of	how	someone	can
intentionally	act	against	his	best	judgment.	The	Ancient	Greeks	called	this	akrasia,	or	lack
of	control,	and	its	opposite	is	self-control.	Aristotle’s	example	of	akrasia	involves	someone
who	is	tempted,	against	his	better	judgment,	to	eat	something	sweet.	When	the	person
eats,	he	is	still	“under	the	influence	(in	a	sense)	of	reason”	(1147b1-2).1	Hence,	self-
control	involves	the	exercise	of	control	over	temptations.	This	usage	of	the	term,	which	is
fairly	standard	in	philosophical	discourse,	contrasts	with	a	modern	colloquial	usage,
whereby	the	opposite	of	having	self-control	involves	losing	the	ability	to	intentionally
control	one’s	actions.2	In	this	paper	I	will	adopt	the	philosophical	usage	of	“self-control”	to
refer	to	overcoming	temptations	while	remembering	that,	as	J.	L.	Austin	said,	we	can	help
ourselves	to	two	portions	of	dessert	without	ravening	and	that	“We	often	succumb	to
temptation	with	calm	and	even	with	finesse”	(Austin,	1956–1957,	p.	24	n.13).
(p.49)	 Aristotle	gives	a	causal	account	of	akrasia,	as	located	in	the	reasoning	process	of
the	akrates.	For	Aristotle,	reasoning	is	characterized	as	a	syllogism,	involving	a	major	and
a	minor	premise.	The	major	premise	is	a	universal	principle	and	the	minor	premise	is	a
particular	one	about	the	situation	at	hand.	In	book	VI,	Aristotle	has	declared	that	the
second,	minor	premise	is	the	“starting	point”	of	reasoning	(1143b4-6)	and	that	the
universals	are	reached	from	these	particulars,	of	which	we	have	perception.
Aristotle	illustrates	the	reasoning	of	the	akrates	as	follows:
Particular	premise: This	thing	is	sweet
Universal	premise: Everything	sweet	ought	to	be	tasted
———————————————————————
Conclusion: This	thing	ought	to	be	tasted3
Opposed	to	this	is	a	second	syllogism,	whose	conclusion	is	that	the	akrates	should	not
taste	the	thing.	But,	according	to	Aristotle,	the	akrates	uses	only	the	universal	and	not	the
particular	premise	of	the	second	syllogism.	Although	the	akrates	“has”	knowledge	of	the
particular	premise	s/he	does	not	“use”	it	(1146b31ff),	where	“using”	should	be
understood	as	thinking	of	the	premise	or	having	it	before	one’s	mind	(Bostock,	2000	pp.
125–126).4	Hence,	Aristotle	says	that	the	akrates	is	ignorant	of	particular	facts	that	are
“within	the	sphere	of	perception”	(1147a26).
However,	Aristotle	does	not	specify	the	content	of	the	second	syllogism,	the	particular
facts	that	the	akrates	does	not	perceive,	or	the	premise	that	s/he	does	not	use.	The
Ancients	were	more	concerned	with	the	puzzle	of	how	akratic	action	could	exist	than	with
how	people	exercise	self-control.
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This	contrasts	with	decision	theory,	whose	framework	suggests	that	people	will	always
give	into	temptations	and	where	the	puzzle	is	to	explain	how	people	exert	self-control.	In
decision	theory,	problems	of	overcoming	temptation	are	naturally	modeled	within	the
framework	of	“dynamic	choice,”	where	one	person	makes	a	sequence	of	decisions	over
time.	It	is	conventional	to	analyze	problems	of	dynamic	choice	as	if,	at	each	time	t	at	which
the	person	has	to	make	a	decision,	that	decision	is	made	by	a	distinct	transient	agent,
“the	person	at	time	t.”	Each	transient	agent	is	treated	as	an	independent	rational	decision
maker.	In	this	framework,	self-control	is	a	problem	of	diachronic	consistency,	(p.50)
where	the	profile	of	choices	that	seems	best	from	the	point	of	view	of	an	early	transient
agent	relies	on	a	choice	by	a	later	agent	that	will	not	seem	best	from	the	later	agent’s
point	of	view.	The	early	transient	agent	would	like	to	implement	a	plan	that	she	cannot	rely
on	her	later	self	to	carry	through.	Standard	examples	of	the	problem	are	going	on	diets,
giving	up	smoking,	and	studying	for	an	exam.
One	objection	to	the	decision	theoretic	account	is	that	it	provides	a	neat	model	of
temptation	at	the	expense	of	an	impoverished	notion	of	agency.	Agency	is	entirely	vested
in	the	transient	agents;	there	is	no	notion	of	a	self	that	extends	over	time.	It	is	as	if	every
transient	agent	asks,	“What	should	I-now	do?”	The	instruments	for	achieving	self-control
are	limited	to	precommitments,	actions	that	constrain	the	choices	or	alter	the	incentives
that	will	be	available	to	future	selves;	making	a	resolution	in	the	hope	that	it	will	affect
future	behavior	is	“naive”	(Strotz,	1955–1956).	There	is	no	sense	of	an	extended	agency
over	time,	whereby	earlier	selves	make	plans	for	the	person	over	time	that	influence
later	selves	because	of	their	status	as	plans.
In	this	paper,	I	place	the	decision	theoretic	account	of	temptation	within	a	framework	that
allows	multiple	levels	of	agency	and	use	this	to	show	how	the	rational	agents	of	decision
theory	can	achieve	self-control.	The	idea	of	multiple	levels	of	agency	has	been	articulated
at	the	interpersonal	level,	where	theories	of	team	reasoning	allow	agents	to	ask,	“What
should	we	do?”	and	identify	distinctive	modes	of	reasoning	used	by	people	in	teams
(Bacharach,	2006;	Sugden,	1993).	I	apply	team	reasoning	at	the	intrapersonal	level,
modeling	the	self	as	a	team	of	transient	agents	over	time.	The	resulting	account	of	self-
control	is	Aristotelian	in	flavor,	in	that	it	involves	reasoning	schemas	and	perception,	and	it
is	compatible	with	some	of	the	psychological	findings	about	self-control.
In	order	to	motivate	the	application	of	team	reasoning	to	the	problem	of	self-control,	I
begin	by	showing	how	the	problem	of	self-control	can	be	seen	as	a	prisoner’s	dilemma.
The	prisoner’s	dilemma	set-up	is	not	essential	to	the	idea	of	the	person	as	a	team	over
time,	but	it	is	an	important	aspect	of	the	decision	theoretic	puzzle	of	self-control.	The
prisoner’s	dilemma	is	also	one	of	the	puzzles	of	game	theory	that	motivated	the
development	of	team	reasoning,	so	analyzing	the	problem	of	self-control	as	a	prisoner’s
dilemma	makes	very	clear	the	analogy	between	team	reasoning	in	the	interpersonal	and
the	intrapersonal	cases.
Self-Control	as	an	Intrapersonal	Prisoner’s	Dilemma
In	the	prisoner’s	dilemma,	individual	agents	must	choose	between	two	strategies,
commonly	called	defect	and	cooperate.	It	is	in	each	individual’s	interest	(p.51)	 to	defect,
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but	if	everyone	defects	that	leads	to	a	worse	outcome	than	if	all	had	cooperated.	For
instance,	pollution	is	an	example	of	a	prisoner’s	dilemma,	with	defect	being	to	pollute	and
cooperate	refraining	from	polluting.
The	reason	that	the	problem	of	pollution	has	the	form	of	a	dilemma	is	that	there	is	an
externality,	where	each	person’s	action	has	effects	on	other	players	that	are	not
captured	in	the	player’s	own	payoff.	To	illustrate	with	an	example:	the	prisoner’s	dilemma
is	actualized	experimentally	in	“public	goods	games”	with	the	cooperative	action	being
investing	in	a	group	account	(Ledyard,	1995).	Money	in	the	group	account	is	multiplied
up	and	shared	out	among	all	the	players,	with	the	contributor	receiving	less	back	than
she	put	in,	but	the	group	as	a	whole	receiving	more.	If	there	are	n	players,	and	f	is	the
factor	by	which	the	money	is	multiplied,	1	<	f	<	n.	So	contributing	to	the	group	kitty	has
benefits	for	the	other	players,	as	they	receive	more	money	as	a	result	of	the	agent’s
investing.	But	the	agent	who	invests	a	pound	bears	a	cost	of	£1	and	only	gets	back	£f/n,
which	is	less	than	£1.
We	can	see	that	the	problem	of	pollution	has	the	same	basic	structure.	Each	individual
might	prefer	the	outcome	where	the	air	is	clean	(all	cooperate)	to	the	outcome	where	the
air	is	polluted	(all	defect).	However,	the	cost	of	not	polluting	(or	benefits	that	the
nonpolluter	forgoes)	is	borne	entirely	by	the	individual	whereas	the	gains	of	cleaner	air
are	shared	between	the	whole	community.5
Problems	of	self-control	can	have	an	analogous	structure.	Take	an	individual	who	is	a
smoker.6	Each	transient	agent	might	think	that	it	is	better	for	herself,	over	her	lifetime,	to
be	a	nonsmoker	rather	than	a	smoker,	as	that	reduces	the	risk	of	cancer.	In	order	to
implement	this	plan,	the	transient	agent	must	bear	a	cost,	namely,	forgoing	the	enjoyment
of	smoking	a	cigarette.	However,	the	benefit	of	being	a	nonsmoker	is	not	all	captured	by
the	transient	agent.	We	might	think	that	it	is	shared	across	transient	agents	or	even	that	it
accrues	entirely	to	the	transient	agents	at	the	end	of	the	individual’s	life.	The	benefit	of
not	smoking	in	any	period	is	an	externality;	it	is	not	completely	captured	by	the	agent	that
period.
The	plan	that	the	agent	would	most	prefer	to	implement	is	to	smoke	a	cigarette	today	and
give	up	from	tomorrow	onward	(which	is	analogous	to	the	(p.52)	 case	of	pollution,
where	the	most	preferred	outcome	is	to	pollute	while	everyone	else	refrains),	but	that
plan	is	not	realizable	because	the	transient	agent	of	tomorrow	will	face	the	same
preference	structure	and,	hence,	will	not	play	her	part.	So	we	have	a	prisoner’s	dilemma
with	smoking	equivalent	to	defect	and	refraining	to	cooperate.
The	analogy	between	the	interpersonal	and	the	intrapersonal	cases	is	not	exact.	In	the
intrapersonal	case	the	players	do	not	move	simultaneously,	and	it	is	an	asynchronous
prisoner’s	dilemma.	For	this	to	change	the	analysis,	it	is	not	sufficient	that	the	agents
move	in	sequence.	It	is	also	necessary	that	the	second	player	knows	what	the	first	player
did.	If	the	transient	agents	have	perfect	recall	of	past	moves,	then,	in	some	respects,	a
better	analogy	for	the	intrapersonal	case	is	found	in	Hume’s	two	farmers,	who	play	an
asynchronous	prisoner’s	dilemma:7
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Your	corn	is	ripe	to-day;	mine	will	be	so	to-morrow.	’Tis	profitable	for	us	both,	that
I	shou’d	labour	with	you	to-day,	and	that	you	shou’d	aid	me	to-morrow.	I	have	no
kindness	for	you,	and	know	you	have	as	little	for	me.	I	will	not,	therefore,	take	any
pains	upon	your	account;	and	should	I	labour	with	you	upon	my	own	account,	in
expectation	of	a	return,	I	know	I	shou’d	be	disappointed,	and	that	I	shou’d	in	vain
depend	upon	your	gratitude.	Here	then	I	leave	you	to	labour	alone:	You	treat	me
in	the	same	manner.	The	seasons	change;	and	both	of	us	lose	our	harvests	for	want
of	mutual	confidence	and	security.
(Hume	1739–1740/1978,	pp.	520–521)
In	an	asynchronous	game,	the	second	player’s	strategy	can	be	conditional	on	what	the
first	player	does,	so	she	has	four	strategies	instead	of	two:	cooperate	regardless,	defect
regardless,	cooperate	if	player	one	cooperates	and	defect	if	she	defects,	defect	if	player
one	cooperates	and	cooperate	if	she	defects.	In	the	interpersonal	prisoner’s	dilemma
defect	is	a	dominant	strategy:	whatever	the	other	player	does	each	player	does	best	by
defecting.	In	the	asynchronous	dilemma,	(defect,	defect	regardless)	is	the	sole	Nash
equilibrium;	however,	it	is	not	a	dominant	strategy	equilibrium	since	player	two	does
equally	well	if	she	plays	the	strategy	cooperate	if	player	one	cooperates	and	defect	if	she
defects.	But	it	is	usual	to	expect	Nash	equilibrium	strategies	to	be	played	and,	as	Hume
shows	in	the	farmer	example,	backward	induction	also	leads	to	both	agents	defecting.
Smoking	makes	for	a	nice	analogy	with	pollution,	but	the	framework	of	costs	that	are
borne	by	the	current	transient	agent	for	benefits	that	are,	at	least	partly	(p.53)	 and
maybe	wholly,	accrued	by	later	agents	can	also	accommodate	other	classic	examples	of
self-control,	such	as	dieting	and	studying	for	an	exam.
It	might	be	complained	that,	so	far,	I	have	assumed	that	each	transient	agent	cares	only
about	the	here	and	now	whereas,	plausibly,	they	would	also	care	about	the	past	or
future	(i.e.,	they	would	exhibit	some	intrapersonal	altruism).	However,	it	is	equally
plausible	that	people	exhibit	some	“present	bias,”	with	each	transient	agent	giving	herself
relatively	more	weight	than	the	other	transient	agents.	Indeed,	there	is	evidence	of
present	bias	(Ainslie,	1992;	Thaler,	1981)	and	also	of	“hyperbolic	discounting”
(Frederick,	Loewenstein,	&	O’Donoghue,	2002),	which	is	closely	related	to	present	bias
(Ainslie,	1991,	1992;	Laibson,	1997).	Even	if	there	is	some	degree	of	intrapersonal
altruism,	if	each	transient	agent	gives	herself	more	weight	than	the	other	agents,	then	the
agents	fail	to	take	into	account	fully	the	positive	externality.	Hence,	there	is	still	likely	to	be
an	intrapersonal	prisoner’s	dilemma—as	can	be	seen	in	the	model	of	decision	making	over
time	with	some	intrapersonal	altruism	provided	by	myself	and	Robert	Sugden	in	our
conclusion	to	Michael	Bacharach’s	Beyond	Individual	Choice	(Bacharach,	2006).
Further,	displaying	intrapersonal	altruism	is	different	from	agency.	Decision	theory	can
accommodate	altruism,	or	a	concern	for	another	agent’s	outcomes,	which	is	usually
modeled	by	a	“payoff	transformation”	where	the	payoffs	of	the	other	agent	appear	in	the
altruistic	agent’s	utility	function	(e.g.,	Collard,	1978).	But	agency	involves	planning
(Bratman,	1987)	and	identity	(Parfit,	1984,	p.	319),	neither	of	which	appears	in	standard
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decision	theory.	Being	altruistic	does	not	necessarily	solve	problems	of	planning	and
agency,	nor	lead	to	cooperation	in	a	prisoner’s	dilemma.8	The	payoff	transformation
involved	in	altruism	is	not	enough;	introducing	“agency	transformation”	is	also	needed.	In
general,	payoff	transformations	and	agency	transformations	lead	to	different	classes	of
results	(Bacharach,	1999),	hence	the	development	of	theories	of	team	agency.
Reasoning:	Team	Agency	and	Self-Control
The	prisoner’s	dilemma	is	one	of	the	puzzles	of	game	theory	that	motivated	the
development	of	theories	of	team	agency.	Since	any	individual	player	does	better	by
choosing	defect	than	by	choosing	cooperate,	regardless	of	what	other	players	do,	game
theory	both	predicts	and	prescribes	defect.	However,	a	substantial	(p.54)	 number	of
people	cooperate	in	real	life.9	Further,	there	is	a	tension	between	individual	and
collective	rationality	because	the	players	each	do	better	by	all	choosing	cooperate	than
by	all	choosing	defect.	While	any	individual	player	can	reason	to	the	conclusion	that	“The
action	that	gives	the	best	result	for	me	is	defect,”	it	is	also	true	that	“The	set	of	actions
that	gives	the	best	result	for	us	is	not	all	defect.”	But	reasoning	about	“our”	outcomes
has	no	status	in	standard	game	theory.
An	analogous	point	can	be	made	about	the	intrapersonal	prisoner’s	dilemma.	In	the
syntax	of	the	theory	of	dynamic	choice,	each	transient	agent	asks	separately,	“What
should	I-now	do?”	and,	in	the	prisoner’s	dilemma,	the	answer	is	to	defect.	Intuitively,	it
seems	reasonable	for	the	players	to	ask	a	different	question,	“What	should	I	the	person
over	time	do?”	in	which	case	the	answer	is	surely	not	to	defect	in	every	time	period.
Indeed,	this	latter	question	seems	more	than	reasonable;	if	anything,	it	is	the	standard
model	of	dynamic	choice	that	seems	implausible,	with	its	absence	of	intentions,	plans,	or
any	sense	of	agency	that	extends	over	time.
Theories	of	team	agency	try	to	reformulate	game	theory	in	such	a	way	that	“What	should
we	do?”	is	a	meaningful	question.	The	basic	idea	of	team	reasoning	is	that,	when	an
individual	reasons	as	a	member	of	a	team,	she	considers	which	combination	of	actions	by
members	of	the	team	would	best	promote	the	team’s	objective,	and	then	performs	her
part	of	that	combination.	Although	the	theory	was	originally	developed	with	reference	to
individuals,	it	could	equally	be	applied	to	the	transient	agents	of	dynamic	choice	theory,
with	the	person	being	a	team	of	transient	agents	over	time.
We	can	follow	Gold	and	Sugden	(2007a,	2007b)	in	representing	reasoning	using	schemas
of	practical	reasoning,	where	agents	infer	conclusions	about	what	they	should	do	from
premises	that	include	propositions	about	what	they	are	seeking	to	achieve	and	about	the
decision	environment	(which	might	respectively	be	thought	of	as	analogs	of	Aristotle’s
general	and	particular	premises).	This	is	another	way	of	representing	the	instrumental
reasoning	of	game	theory:	the	standard	of	success	is	taken	as	given	and	the	conclusions
tell	the	agent	what	s/he	should	do	in	order	to	be	as	successful	as	possible	according	to
that	standard.
There	are	four	possible	outcomes,	O	i,	corresponding	to	the	four	combinations	of	actions:
O	1	from	(cooperate,	defect),	O	2	from	(cooperate,	cooperate),	O	3	from	(defect,	defect),
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and	O	4	from	(defect,	cooperate).	An	“outcome”	includes	everything	that	the	players
want	to	achieve.
In	the	case	of	a	two-period	prisoner’s	dilemma,	the	backward	induction	reasoning	of	the
second	player	could	have	the	following	form	(the	(p.55)	 propositions	above	the	line	are
premises,	while	the	proposition	below	the	line	is	the	conclusion):10
Schema	1:	player	2’s	reasoning	(individual	agency)
(1)	I	must	choose	either	to	cooperate	or	defect.
(2)	If	the	other	player	has	chosen	to	cooperate,	then	the	outcome	will	either
be	O	1	or	O	2.
(3)	If	the	other	player	has	chosen	to	defect,	then	the	outcome	will	either	be
O	3	or	O	4.
(4)	I	prefer	O	1	to	O	2	and	O	3	to	O	4;	that	is,	whatever	player	1	has	done,	I
prefer	the	outcome	that	results	from	my	playing	defect.
——————————————————————————————
I	should	choose	to	defect.
The	schema	could	be	used	by	an	individual	playing	an	asynchronous	prisoner’s	dilemma
or	by	a	transient	agent	playing	a	prisoner’s	dilemma	over	time	with	other	transient
agents.	The	reasoning	is	instrumental	practical	reasoning,	and	the	“should”	is	the
normativity	of	instrumental	rationality.11
In	an	asynchronous	dilemma,	the	first	player	can	reason	by	backward	induction,	as
follows:
Schema	2:	player	1’s	reasoning	(individual	agency)
(1)	I	must	choose	either	to	cooperate	or	defect.
(2)	If	I	choose	to	cooperate	the	outcome	will	be	O	1.
(3)	If	I	choose	defect	the	outcome	will	be	O	3.
(4)	I	prefer	O	3	to	O	1.
————————————–—————————————————
I	should	choose	to	defect.
(p.56)	 These	two	schemas	show	how	the	two	players	in	an	asynchronous	prisoner’s
dilemma	can	reason	that	they	should	defect.	(In	a	synchronic	prisoner’s	dilemma,	both
players	will	use	a	version	of	schema	1.)	They	are	equivalent	to	individual	rationality	in
standard	game	theory	or	to	the	reasoning	of	the	transient	agents	in	dynamic	choice
theory,	where	I	may	be	understood	as	I-now.
If	we	allow,	instead,	that	the	players	can	ask,	“What	should	we	do?”	and	consider	all
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possible	plans,	we	get	a	schema	with	the	following	pattern:
Schema	3:	collective	rationality	(team	agency)
(1)	We	must	choose	one	of	(defect,	cooperate),	(defect,	defect),	(cooperate,
defect),	(cooperate,	cooperate).
(2)	If	we	choose	(cooperate,	defect)	the	outcome	will	be	O	1.
(3)	If	we	choose	(cooperate,	cooperate)	the	outcome	will	be	O	2.
(4)	If	we	choose	(defect,	defect)	the	outcome	will	be	O	3.
(5)	If	we	choose	(defect,	cooperate)	the	outcome	will	be	O	4.
(6)	We	want	to	achieve	O	a	more	than	we	want	to	achieve	O	b,	O	c,	O	d.
————————————–——————————————————
We	should	choose	(x,	y).
In	the	interpersonal	case	the	we	is	a	team	of	individuals;	in	the	intrapersonal	case	the	we
is	a	team	of	transient	agents	that	make	up	the	agent	over	time.	The	actions	that	the	team
should	take	depend	on	how	the	team	ranks	the	outcomes,	that	is,	on	the	content	of
premise	(6).	We	might	think	of	O	a	as	the	group	goal.	The	question	of	how	team	goals
should	relate	to	the	rankings	of	its	members	is	complex	(see	Gold,	2012),	but	it	seems
clear	that	the	team	would	rank	the	outcome	of	(cooperate,	cooperate)	above	that	of
(defect,	defect)	as	the	former	is	ranked	higher	by	every	player.
In	the	interpersonal	case,	it	seems	reasonable	to	assume	that	the	players	will	be	treated
symmetrically,	and	Gold	and	Sugden	(2007a)	suggest	that	it	is	natural	to	think	that	the
group	will	rank	(cooperate,	cooperate)	above	(defect,	cooperate)	and	(cooperate,	defect).
In	the	intra-personal	case,	symmetry	is	a	less	obvious	assumption.12	However,
whichever	of	the	three	remaining	outcomes,	(cooperate,	cooperate),	(defect,	cooperate),
and	(cooperate,	defect),	the	person	over	time	ranks	highest,	it	involves	at	least	one
transient	agent	taking	an	action	that	conflicts	with	her	ranking	as	a	person	over	time.	If
she	follows	team	reasoning	to	its	end	and	concludes	that	she	should	do	her	part	in	the
best	(p.57)	 team	plan,	then	that	decision	maker	has	an	Aristotelian	problem	of	self-
control,	with	two	conflicting	reasoning	schemas,	depending	on	whether	she	reasons	as	a
transient	agent	or	as	a	team	over	time.
Perception:	Framing	and	Self-Control
Given	that	the	agent	has	two	conflicting	reasoning	schemas,	what	makes	her	use	one	over
the	other?	In	the	Aristotelian	account	of	self-control,	the	akrates	does	not	use	the	second
syllogism	because	of	a	failure	of	perception.	Perception,	in	the	form	of	“framing,”	also	has
an	important	role	in	team	reasoning.	As	in	the	case	of	reasoning	discussed	above,	we	can
apply	insights	from	the	interpersonal	to	the	intrapersonal	case.
A	frame	is	the	set	of	concepts	a	person	uses	when	thinking	about	the	world.	Frames	are
notorious	because	of	Kahneman	and	Tversky’s	work	on	framing	effects,	where	changing
the	description	of	a	choice	problem	affects	the	choices	that	people	make	(Tversky	&
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Kahneman,	1981).	In	their	classic	example,	subjects	were	told	that	the	United	States	was
threatened	by	a	deadly	disease,	which	is	expected	to	kill	600	people,	and	asked	to	choose
between	two	vaccination	programs.	Different	groups	of	subjects	received	different
presentations	of	the	decision	problem.	One	group	received	all	the	information	in	terms	of
how	many	of	the	600	lives	would	be	saved	by	each	program,	the	other	in	terms	of	how
many	of	the	600	would	die.	The	modal	choice	of	program	differed	between	groups;	the
implication	was	that	the	presentation	in	terms	of	“saving”	and	“dying”	influenced	people’s
decisions.
Framing	starts	from	the	idea,	familiar	to	philosophers,	that	seeing	involves	“seeing	as.”
When	you	see	the	following	marks,	Ο	Δ	χ,	you	might	see	them	as	a	circle,	a	triangle,	and	a
cross.	Or,	if	you	know	Greek,	you	might	see	them	as	an	omicron,	a	delta,	and	a	xi.	If	you
do	not	know	Greek,	then	the	latter	option	is	not	a	possibility.	A	larger	set	of	descriptions	is
available	to	the	linguist.	However,	the	availability	of	a	larger	set	of	descriptions	does	not
imply	that	they	are	all	used.	Someone	reading	Greek	will	tend	to	see	the	marks	as	letters,
even	though	they	could	equally	be	described	as	shapes.	She	frames	what	she	sees	as
letters,	not	as	shapes.	This	is	like	the	Aristotelian	idea	of	having	knowledge	but	not	using
it.
The	standard	agents	of	decision	theory	use	all	the	knowledge	that	they	have;	they	always
see	their	world	under	all	of	the	infinite	number	of	descriptions	available	to	them.
However,	real	people	are	finite,	so	this	is	never	a	possibility	for	us.	We	have	“bounded
cognition.”13	At	any	time,	we	will	be	using	only	a	small	subset	of	the	concepts	that	could
describe	our	situation.
(p.58)	 Framing	is	an	important	precursor	to	decision	making.	In	order	for	something	to
feature	in	an	agent’s	reasoning,	she	must	have	concepts	related	to	it	in	her	frame.	Hence,
in	order	to	team	reason,	a	player	must	have	the	concept	“we”	in	her	frame.
Many	accounts	of	team	agency	emphasize	the	role	of	commitment	in	group	identification,
be	it	rational	commitment,	moral	commitment,	or	simply	the	endorsement	of	a	particular
mode	of	reasoning	by	the	agent	(Gold	&	Sugden,	2007a,	2007b).	But	even	accounts	of
group	agency	that	do	not	give	perception	a	prominent	role	have	an	implicit	framing	step,
as	seeing	that	a	decision	can	be	described	as	a	problem	for	“us”	is	a	necessary
precondition	for	team	reasoning.14
In	contrast,	Bacharach	(2006)	gives	an	account	where	team	reasoning	is	purely	the	result
of	framing.	For	Bacharach,	certain	features	of	choice-problems	may,	when	salient,
promote	group	identity,	which,	in	turn,	primes	team	reasoning.	In	his	model,	these
transitions	are	all	the	results	of	psychological	processes,	not	of	decisions.	However,	there
is	an	implicit	commitment	to	or	pre-eminence	of	the	we-frame.	Team	reasoners	must	have
the	I-concept	in	their	frame,	as	they	reason	to	conclusions	about	what	individual	actions
they	should	take,	and	because	team	reasoning	can	be	circumspect,	taking	into	account
the	possibility	that	others	do	not	group	identify	but	act	on	individual	reasoning	instead.
Nevertheless,	there	is	an	assumption	that	priming	we-concepts	tends	to	promote	team
reasoning.15
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Bacharach	elides	the	distinction	between	the	noticing	of	we-concepts	and	their	having
what	we	might	call	“motivational	grip”	(Gold,	2012).	Motivational	grip	has	two	components
above	and	beyond	merely	noticing	a	feature	or	concept:	noticing	that	it	is	choice	relevant
and,	given	that	it	has	been	noticed	as	choice	relevant,	deciding	to	act	on	the	reason	it
provides.	Hence,	Bacharach’s	team	reasoners	must	either	not	find	I-reasons	to	be	choice
relevant	or	else	they	have	decided	not	to	act	on	them.	In	order	to	stay	within	a	purely
cognitive	framework,	Bacharach	might	say	that	the	salience	of	the	we-concepts	outweighs
that	of	the	I-concepts.	But,	in	order	for	framing	the	decision	as	a	problem	for	“us”	to
affect	behavior,	we-reasons	must	have	motivating	power,	which	seems	to	presume	an
implicit	commitment	to	the	team	agent.
(p.59)	 We	can	draw	parallels	with	team	reasoning	at	the	intrapersonal	level.	In	the	same
way	that	interpersonal	team	reasoning	requires	the	decision	maker	to	frame	the	decision
as	a	problem	for	us,	intrapersonal	team	reasoning	requires	the	decision	maker	to	frame	it
as	a	problem	for	herself	over	time.	Of	course,	there	is	a	sense	in	which	everyone	knows
she	is	an	extended	self	over	time	but,	as	we	saw	above,	it	is	possible	to	have	that
knowledge	without	using	it	to	frame	a	decision	problem.	Arguably,	it	is	more	natural	for
people	to	think	of	themselves	as	selves	over	time	than	as	transient	agents,	so	the	team
frame	might	be	the	default	in	the	intrapersonal	case.	It	certainly	seems	natural	to	think
that	people	have	an	implicit	commitment	to	their	extended	self	over	time.	The	lack	of	such
a	commitment	is	one	reason	why	the	pure	transient	agent	model	is	impoverished.
When	there	is	temptation,	the	divergence	of	interests	between	the	transient	agent	and
the	person	over	time	is	salient.	At	the	interpersonal	level,	social	identity	theorists	say	that
awareness	of	common	interest	and	a	common	fate	promotes	group	identification,	by
raising	awareness	of	a	relevant	basis	for	categorization	into	groups	(Brewer,	1979).
Conversely,	awareness	of	divergent	individual	interests	may	inhibit	group	identification
and	obscure	awareness	of	any	basis	for	group	categorization,	and	this	may	be	true	in
both	the	interpersonal	and	the	intrapersonal	cases.	Hence,	akrasia	may	be	associated
with	a	lack	of	identification	with	the	self	over	time.
The	idea	that	akrasia	involves	a	failure	of	perception	is	central	to	the	Aristotelian	account.
For	Aristotle,	the	akrates	is	unaware	of	a	particular	premise.	However,	in	the	team
reasoning	account,	the	concept	of	“we”	is	in	every	premise.	Even	the	group	goal	is	“our”
ordering,	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	team,	so	perceiving	it	involves	having	the	concept
of	the	team	in	one’s	frame.	Indeed,	seeing	the	group	goal	may	be	more	important	in
triggering	team	reasoning	than	any	of	the	other	premises	if,	as	social	identity	theorists
claim,	recognizing	a	common	interest	can	trigger	group	identity.	Hence,	it	must	be	that
the	whole	team	reasoning	schema	is	not	used	by	the	akrates.
Psychological	Evidence	and	Discrimination	Between	Theories
The	intrapersonal	team	reasoning	account	implies	that	we	can	improve	self-control	by
increasing	the	salience	of	the	self	over	time,	and	by	increasing	the	salience	of	long-term
goals	relative	to	transient	ones.	The	relative	salience	of	long-term	goals	can	be	increased
either	by	increasing	the	salience	of	the	long	term	or	by	decreasing	the	salience	of	the
short	term,	which	can	be	done	by	focusing	attention	on	the	long-term	goal	or	distracting
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oneself	from	the	immediate	temptation.
(p.60)	 Here	I	present	evidence	that	is	compatible	with	the	intrapersonal	team	reasoning
account	of	self-control,	explore	why	current	evidence	does	not	discriminate	between	the
account	and	other	explanations	of	self-control,	and	suggest	a	way	in	which	the	account
might	have	increased	explanatory	power.
There	is	evidence	that	distraction	from	temptation,	by	engaging	in	other	activities	and
even	just	by	thinking	about	other	activities,	can	increase	self-control	(Mischel	&	Baker,
1975;	Mischel,	Ebbesen,	&	Zeiss,	1972).16	And,	if	directing	attention	is	an	effortful
activity,	then	an	account	where	self-control	involves	focusing	attention	is	consistent	with
some	of	the	psychological	evidence	on	ego	depletion,	the	idea	that	willpower	is	a	limited
resource.	Being	asked	to	exert	self-control	in	a	first	task	adversely	affects	subjects’
performance	in	a	second	task	that	also	requires	self-control	(Baumeister	et	al.,	1998;
Muraven,	Tice,	&	Baumeister,	1998).	Conversely,	high	glucose	levels	and	consumption	of
calories	can	increase	self-control	(Gailliot	et	al.,	2007).	Muraven	and	Baumeister	(2000)
make	an	analogy	between	willpower	and	a	muscle,	whose	strength	gets	depleted	as	you
use	it,	but	whose	strength	can	be	built	up	with	exercise.	If	the	analogy	is	correct,	it
implies	that	there	is	some	unspecified	effortful	mechanism	underlying	self-control.
Focusing	attention	plausibly	requires	effort,	especially	when	one	is	trying	to	focus
attention	away	from	a	salient	stimulus.	If	we	think	that	controlling	attention	can	be
learned,	then	the	account	can	also	explain	why	people	can	improve	their	self-control	with
practice	(Muraven,	Baumeister,	&	Tice,	1999).
However,	while	the	efficacy	of	directing	attention	between	outcomes	is	consistent	with
the	intrapersonal	team	reasoning	account,	we	can	talk	about	framing	the	options	without
introducing	levels	of	agency.	The	idea	that	we	can	solve	problems	of	self-control	by
redescribing	the	options	is	already	present	in	the	philosophical	literature	(Kennett	&
Smith,	1996;	Mele,	2012),	and	there	are	models	that	explain	akrasia	as	a	conflict	of
reasons	(Kavka,	1991;	Pettit,	2003)	and	as	conflicting	perceptions	of	reasons	(Gold,	2005;
Schick,	1991).
The	model	of	intrapersonal	team	reasoning	suggests	that,	in	addition	to	reframing	the
options,	we	should	be	able	to	improve	self-control	by	reframing	the	agent.	This
hypothesis	needs	further	research.	Here	are	two	reasons	for	thinking	that	it	might	be
fruitful.
First,	there	is	some	evidence	on	the	self	over	time	and	delayed	gratification,	from	the
work	of	Dan	Bartels	and	colleagues	(Bartels	&	Rips,	2010;	Bartels	&	Urminsky,	2011).
This	starts	from	Derek	Parfit’s	(1984)	argument	that	personal	identity	depends	on
psychological	connectedness,	having	psychological	(p.61)	 connections	with	our	future
selves	such	as	sharing	memories,	intentions,	beliefs,	and	desires.	Bartels	wanted	to	see	if
there	is	a	correlation	between	connectedness	and	the	“discount	rate,”	which	leads	us	to
choose	sooner	smaller	rewards	over	larger	later	ones.	In	fact,	he	tested	the	relation
between	perceived	connectedness	and	the	discount	rate,	finding	that	subjects	who	rated
themselves	as	more	connected	to	later	selves	were	more	patient	(Bartels	&	Rips,	2010)
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and	that	connectedness	can	be	manipulated,	resulting	in	increased	patience	(Bartels	&
Urminsky,	2011).
Bartels’	work	involves	the	perception	of	psychological	connectedness.	This	is	not	the	same
as	the	perception	of	shared	agency,	but	it	is	plausible	that	they	are	related.	At	the
interpersonal	level,	identification	with	other	members	of	a	group	enhances	the
accessibility	of	shared	characteristics	(Smith	&	Henry,	1996).	Perceived	similarities	may
also	increase	the	likelihood	of	group	identification.	It	is	likely	that	the	causality	runs	in	both
directions.	At	the	intrapersonal	level,	we	might	hope	that	future	research	will	attempt	to
discriminate	between	the	effects	of	psychological	connectedness	and	those	of	team
agency	or,	alternatively	(should	discrimination	not	be	possible),	to	explore	the
connections	between	the	two.
A	further	confound	is	that	the	perception	of	psychological	connectedness	might	increase
intrapersonal	altruism	as	well	as	or	instead	of	increasing	the	perception	of	the	self	as	an
agent	over	time.	Again,	intrapersonal	altruism	and	sense	of	agency	may	be	related:
framing	a	decision	as	a	problem	for	us	may	also	encourage	a	concern	for	the	welfare	of
the	other	transient	agents	that	belong	to	the	self	over	time.	The	same	issue	occurs	at	the
interpersonal	level,	where	the	question	becomes	how	to	discriminate	between
interventions	that	increase	interpersonal	altruism	and	those	that	make	salient	team
agency.	Bacharach	(2006)	claims	that	a	test	that	discriminates	team	reasoning	can	be
constructed	by	using	the	fact	that	team	reasoners	take	actions	that	lead	to	the	group
utility	maximizing	outcome,	whereas	individual	reasoners	will	sometimes	end	up	at	an
outcome	with	lower	payoffs,	if	it	is	salient	and	solves	a	coordination	problem.	More	work
remains	to	be	done,	at	both	the	interpersonal	and	intrapersonal	level.
A	second	reason	favoring	the	intrapersonal	team	reasoning	account	is	that	it	has
increased	explanatory	power.	There	is	a	datum	that	cannot	be	explained	by	a	simple
framing	of	the	object	account:	the	relation	between	borderline	personality	disorder
(BPD)	and	self-control.	A	personality	disorder	occurs	when	the	way	that	a	person	is
inclined	to	think,	feel,	and	act	causes	that	person	severe	psychological	distress,	impairs
her	in	important	contexts,	and	does	her	harm	(Pickhard,	2011).	BPD	is	defined	by
instability	of	interpersonal	relationships,	self-image,	and	affects,	and	a	marked	impulsivity.
A	person	is	diagnosed	with	(p.62)	 BPD	when	she	displays	at	least	five	of	a	list	of
diagnostic	traits,	which	include	“identity	disturbance:	markedly	and	persistently	unstable
self-image	or	sense	of	self”	and	“impulsivity	in	at	least	two	areas	that	are	potentially	self-
damaging”	(American	Psychiatric	Association,	2000,	p.	706).
BPD	patients	have	a	fractured	sense	of	self.	They	do	not	identify	with	their	later	selves
and	they	do	not	think	through	the	consequences	of	their	actions	on	either	themselves	or
others.	The	amount	of	impulsivity	displayed	by	BPD	patients	can	be	extreme,	and	their
inability	to	carry	through	plans	causes	severe	detriment	to	their	lives.	They	cannot	hold
down	jobs	and	they	have	impoverished	relationships.	However,	although	impulsivity	is	a
diagnostic	criterion	for	BPD,	there	is	currently	no	theoretical	explanation	of	the	co-
occurrence	of	impulsivity	and	identity	disturbance.
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BPD	is	also	characterized	by	“affective	instability,”	with	intense	emotions	and	mood
swings	(American	Psychiatric	Association,	2000).	Current	treatments	for	BPD,	such	as
therapies	involving	“mindfulness”	(Breslin,	Zack,	&	McMain,	2002)	and	“mentalizing”
(Fonagy	&	Bateman,	2007),	focus	on	patients’	emotional	shifts,	helping	them	to	take	a
more	detached	perspective	on	intense	emotions,	especially	negative	ones,	and	teaching
them	how	to	focus	their	attention.	There	is	evidence	that	BPD	patients	have	difficulty	in
controlling	their	attention	(Hoermann	et	al.,	2005;	Lenzenweger	et	al.,	2004;	Posner	et	al.,
2002)	and	that	negative	affective	cues	activate	alcohol	cognitions	in	problem	drinkers	with
psychiatric	disorders	(Zack,	Toneatto,	&	MacLeod,	1999,	2002).	As	with	other	evidence
cited	above,	this	could	be	explained	by	an	account	of	self-control	as	involving	reframing
options.	However,	in	this	case,	that	account	leaves	a	feature	of	the	condition	unexplained,
namely,	the	connection	between	unstable	self-identity	and	impulsivity—exactly	the	extra
component	that	the	intrapersonal	team	reasoning	theory	can	provide.
The	theory	of	intrapersonal	team	reasoning	is	not	the	only	account	of	self-control	that
invokes	a	division	of	agency	and	a	diachronic	perspective.	There	are	models	involving	a
long-	and	a	short-sighted	self	(Schelling,	1984),	a	planner	and	a	doer	(Thaler	&	Shefrin,
1981),	global	and	local	choice	(Heyman,	2009),	and	short-range	and	long-range	interests
(Ainslie,	1992).	Intrapersonal	team	reasoning	is	compatible	with	some	of	these	accounts,
providing	more	detail	about	what	the	long-sighted	or	global	perspective	involves,	and
explicit	modeling	of	the	interaction	of	successive	transient	agents.	However,	it	is	not
obviously	compatible	with	accounts	where	the	long-range	interest	is	constrained	to
always	take	the	same	action	in	every	period	(e.g.,	Ainslie,	1992).	In	the	team	reasoning
account,	it	is	possible	that	the	optimal	team	plan	involves	occasional	lapses,	if	that
produces	the	best	outcome	for	the	self	over	time.
(p.63)	 Conclusion
Aristotle	examined	the	reasoning	of	the	akratic	agent	but	did	not	specify	the	reasoning	of
the	agent	who	exhibits	self-control.	Similarly,	the	framework	of	decision	theory	explains
why	people	would	give	in	to	temptations	but	not	how	people	can	use	willpower	to	exert
self-control.	I	introduced	the	idea	of	levels	of	agency,	with	the	self	as	a	team	over	time
that	makes	and	follows	plans,	and	showed	how	intrapersonal	team	reasoning	can	lead	to
self-control.	The	account	is	Aristotelian	in	that	it	involves	reasoning	schema	and	a	lack	of
perception	on	the	part	of	the	akratic	agent,	who	does	not	see	her	decision	problem	as	a
problem	for	her	self	over	time.	It	suggests	a	role	not	just	for	framing	of	the	options,	but
also	for	framing	of	the	agent.	This	would	merit	further	investigation	in	future	research.
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Notes:
(1.)	All	quotations	from	the	Nicomachean	Ethics	refer	to	the	translation	by	Ross	in	Barnes
(1984)	and	the	standard	Bekker	page	reference	is	given.
(2.)	The	modern	usage	is	at	some	points	implied	in	Aristotle,	for	instance,	when	he	says
that	the	akrates	“acts	with	passion	and	not	choice”	(1111b13).	In	determining	Aristotle’s
position,	much	turns	on	the	interpretation	of	“choice.”	But	my	aim	is	not	to	provide	an
accurate	reconstruction	of	Aristotle;	rather,	it	is	to	explore	an	interesting	idea	that	can	be
divined	in	his	work.	(For	an	interesting	reconstruction	that	is	broadly	sympathetic	to	the
ideas	in	this	paper,	see	Moss,	2009.)	Interpretive	issues,	including	interpretations	that
are	at	odds	with	those	that	I	use,	will	be	confined	to	the	footnotes.
(3.)	It	is	generally	thought	that	Aristotle	intended	that	the	conclusion	is	also	an	action.	For
a	minority	dissenting	view	that	the	conclusion	of	the	syllogism	is	not	identical	with	the
action,	see	Charles	(1984),	and	for	an	argument	that	the	conclusion	of	the	syllogism
cannot	also	be	an	action	if	akrasia	is	to	exist,	see	Wiggins	(1980).
(4.)	Some	commentators	favor	an	interpretation	where	the	proposition	that	is	known	but
not	used	is	the	conclusion	of	the	second	syllogism	(e.g.,	Charles,	1984;	Urmson,	1988).
(5.)	With	a	very	large	number	of	individuals	and	small	incremental	benefits,	which	are
hence	spread	very	thin,	this	can	result	in	the	benefits	from	any	one	person’s	action	being
imperceptible.	For	discussion	of	imperceptible	benefits	see	McCarthy	and	Arntzenius
(1997).	But	it	is	the	dilemma	structure	that	is	key	to	the	incentive	structure	of	pollution,
regardless	of	whether	or	not	the	benefits	are	imperceptible.
(6.)	Nicotine	is	an	addictive	substance.	Arguably,	addiction	is	simply	a	species	of	self-
control	problem	(Heyman,	2009),	but	any	reader	who	thinks	that	addiction	adds	extra
complications	to	problems	of	self-control	should	either	assume	our	smoker	is	not	an
addict	or	transpose	the	example	to	a	case	that	clearly	does	not	involve	addiction,	such	as
studying	for	an	exam.
(7.)	For	more	on	the	asynchronous	prisoner’s	dilemma	in	Hume	see	Vanderschraaf
(1998)	and	Skyrms	(1998).
(8.)	Two	golden	rule	altruists	playing	a	prisoner’s	dilemma,	who	each	give	equal	weight	to
self	and	others’	payoffs	in	their	utility	functions,	may	transform	the	dilemma	into	a	Hi-Lo
game,	which	has	two	equilibria	and,	hence,	an	element	of	coordination	(Gold	&	Sugden,
2007a).	Standard	game	theory	cannot	prescribe	a	unique	course	of	play	where	there	is
more	than	one	equilibrium,	even	if	one	of	the	two	equilibria	gives	a	strictly	higher	payoff
to	both	players.	Hi-Lo	is	another	of	the	“puzzles”	that	motivated	the	development	of
theories	of	team	agency.
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(9.)	In	experiments	in	which	people	play	the	prisoner’s	dilemma	for	money,	anonymously
and	without	repetition,	the	proportion	of	participants	choosing	cooperate	is	typically
between	40	and	50	percent	(Sally,	1995).
(10.)	I	follow	philosophical	tradition	in	showing	reasoning	as	the	manipulation	of
propositions,	which	is	also	naturally	interpreted	as	conscious	manipulation.	However,
neither	of	these	is	necessary	for	my	account.	Decision	theory	is	noncommittal	about	the
mental	processes	underlying	the	choice.	In	cognitive	science	a	broader	definition	of
reasoning	operates,	where	reasoning	can	refer	to	subconscious	processes	and
algorithms.	The	schema	presents	a	“rationalization”	of	the	choice;	that	is,	it	shows	how	it
could	be	the	outcome	of	a	rational	process.
(11.)	One	might	think	that	instrumental	rationality	provides	only	prima	facie	reasons	and
that	what	an	agent	all	things	considered	ought	to	do	is	a	question	about	ethics	or	morality.
In	some	theories	of	team	agency,	team	reasoning	is	required	by	morality	(see	the
discussion	in	Gold	&	Sugden,	2007b).	Under	that	interpretation	of	team	reasoning,	my
analysis	shows	how	reasoning	as	a	transient	agent	(or	as	an	individual,	in	the
interpersonal	case)	can	lead	to	deviations	from	ethically	correct	actions.	This	sort	of	lack
of	self-control	is	what	Kennett	and	Smith	(1996)	label	a	failure	of	orthonomy,	our	capacity
to	act	in	accordance	with	our	normative	reasons.
(12.)	With	more	than	two	players,	it	is	possible	to	formulate	more	complicated	production
functions,	which	specify	how	combinations	of	cooperative	contributions	translate	into
benefits,	where	the	optimal	outcome	for	the	team	has	some,	but	not	all,	team	members
cooperating.	That	might	be	a	better	model	for	examples	like	healthy	eating	and	studying.
In	that	case,	it	is	the	transient	agents	who	are	assigned	to	make	a	cooperative
contribution	that	face	a	problem	of	self-control.
(13.)	The	allusion	to	Herbert	Simon’s	“bounded	rationality”	is	intentional	(Simon,	1955).
Bounded	rationality	is	the	idea	that,	unlike	the	ideal	agents	of	decision	theory,	real	agents
are	subject	to	cognitive	limitations.	Simon’s	research	program	emphasized	limitations	on
information	processing.	Bounded	cognition	is	(at	least	partly)	a	cognitive	limitation.	So,
strictly	speaking,	bounded	cognition	is	a	species	of	bounded	rationality,	albeit	not	one	that
has	come	under	much	scrutiny.	One	advantage	of	the	moniker	“bounded	cognition”	is
that	it	does	not	mention	rationality,	hopefully	avoiding	the	increasing	tendency	to	confuse
bounded	rationality	with	irrationality	(Gigerenzer,	1997),	when	questions	of	rationality
are	really	still	up	for	debate.
(14.)	See	Gold	(2012)	for	a	more	detailed	examination	of	this	point	with	respect	to
Sugden’s	account.
(15.)	In	an	earlier	presentation	of	his	theory,	Bacharach	(1997)	allows	that	there	is	an
I-frame,	a	we-frame,	and	a	superordinate	frame,	oscillating	between	the	I-	and
we-perspectives.	Smerilli	(2012)	explores	this	further,	providing	a	simple	model	of
vacillation	between	I-	and	we-modes	of	reasoning.
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(16.)	Mischel’s	experimental	paradigm	involves	a	child	who	can	obtain	a	less	preferred
food	reward	immediately	or	wait	for	a	more	preferred	food	reward.	Since	the	temptation
and	the	reward	are	in	the	same	currency,	distractions	are	distractions	both	from	the
temptation	and	the	more	preferred	reward,	which	is	the	long-term	goal.
